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Abstract: Financial constraints affecting new firms are some of the factors most cited for 
impeding entrepreneurial dynamics from flourishing. This article introduces the problem of 
regional patterns of financial constraints. The research is conducted with regard to the French 
regions and the new French firms being tracked at the firm level. It refers to entrepreneurial 
projects that are concretized in new firms. General entrepreneurial intentions in the French 
population that are aborted due to financial constraints are not reported. The point is of 
importance as the firm financing conditions are considered. First, an assessment of the 
regional banking activity leads to the conclusion of a relatively homogeneous situation, the 
activity in the core-region Île-de-France appearing however more contrasted. Second, the 
financial constraints affecting new firms are distinguished according to a four-case typology 
of credit rationing. It appears, inter alia, that a majority of firms is not facing credit rationing, 
but also that a non-negligible share is “self-constrained”. The classification is, third and 
finally, differentiated according to the regions. Despite the relatively homogeneous banking 
supply, some differences may still be at work. The explanations are hypothetical at this stage but 
evidence suggests that the regional dimension should definitely deserve further attention. 
 
Résumé: Les contraintes financières pesant sur les nouvelles firmes sont fréquemment citées 
parmi les facteurs faisant obstacle aux dynamiques entrepreneuriales. Cet article introduit la 
problématique de patterns régionaux eu égard à ces contraintes. La recherche est menée en 
référence aux régions françaises et aux projets entrepreneuriaux qui aboutissent à la création 
de firmes. Les intentions entrepreneuriales générales dans la population qui ne trouvent pas de 
concrétisation, notamment à la suite de contraintes financières, ne sont pas étudiées ici. Le 
point a son importance dès lors que les conditions de financement sont identifiées. Primo, une 
évaluation de l’activité bancaire régionale aboutit à la conclusion d’une situation relativement 
homogène, l’activité en l’Île-de-France apparaissant néanmoins plus contrastée. Secundo, les 
contraintes financières affectant les nouvelles firmes font l’objet d’un examen typologique. Il 
ressort qu’une majorité de firmes n’est pas confrontée au rationnement du crédit mais aussi 
qu’une part non négligeable est « autocontrainte ». Tertio, la classification proposée est 
différenciée selon les régions. Malgré une offre bancaire relativement homogène, des 
différences peuvent encore être à l’oeuvre. Les explications sont hypothétiques à ce stade 
mais l’évidence suggère que la dimension régionale mérite un examen plus approfondi. 
 
Version: December 2005. 
JEL-code: G20, M13, R10. 
Keywords: Financial constraints, Credit rationing, New Firms, Regional Disparities. 
Acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank the researchers who discussed earlier 
versions of the article during the ASRDLF Conference, Brussels, September 1-3, 2004, and 
the workshop on “Banking Relationships”, Lille, May 23-24, 2005. In particular, thanks are 
due to M. Boutillier, H. Degryse and S. Ongena. The authors are also grateful to I. Beckman 
for additional comments. The usual caveat applies. 
 1. Introduction  
Over the last fifteen years, a huge theoretical and empirical research program has been 
dedicated to the study of the financial system from an international standpoint. This research 
program deals more precisely with two questions. The first one revolves around differences in 
the way firms are financed in the most developed countries (Mayer, 1988, Hacketal, Schmidt, 
2003). A controversial debate is in progress on this question1. A second strand of literature 
acknowledges the existence of an imperfectly harmonized financing system and looks for the 
reasons why it may differ (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1999) and for the 
consequences these differences may imply for economic growth (Levine, 1997). Thus, the 
question of how much financial systems differ from an international standpoint is clearly 
acknowledged as an important question and is fully integrated in the vast empirical literature on 
corporate governance.  
Although the study of financing patterns with regard to firms within an international 
perspective is well established, the question of differences at the regional level has been almost 
completely ignored in the literature, with the exception of analyses dealing with the United-
States and Italy. Until the “Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking” and the “Branching Efficiency Act” 
in 1994, the USA had been characterised by a very decentralised banking system as the 1927 
“McFadden Act” specifically prohibited intrastate branching by allowing a national bank to 
branch only within the city in which it is located and prohibiting any holding company bank 
from owning and operating banks in more than one state. The situation is different for Italy as 
the legislation, and in particular the banking legislation, is perfectly unified. The argument for 
interregional differences here is mainly based on the importance of cultural aspects, a quite 
mythic cult for proximity and the importance of trust and interpersonal links. For these 
countries, some empirical researches have been made to know whether and how local financial 
patterns matter2. The authors highlight the significant contribution of local financing features. 
This article deals with this question in the French context. More precisely, it introduces 
the issue of regional patterns of financial constraints with regard to the French regions and the 
new French firms at the firm level.  
The microeconomic background of this research goes back to the seminal work of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). Given informational asymmetries and agency problems, these authors show 
that an equilibrium can emerge with rationing on the credit market. The same kind of result 
applies for the equity market (Hellman and Stiglitz, 2000, Hellman, 1995). From a theoretical 
standpoint, the rationing of small firms on the market of external financing is easy to 
demonstrate (Binks, Ennew, 1995; Berger, Udell, 1998). The empirical treatment of this 
question is more difficult because available data on financing are regularly extracted from 
balance sheets and economists must cope with the problem of over-determination of variables.  
In this article, information on new French firms, collected at the individual level, is used 
to build indicators on the finance gap they are confronted with. We analyse the results not only 
at the micro level but at the regional level as well. The main question underlying the research is 
indeed to assess whether local finance patterns are observable in France. This question is 
analysed theoretically in the following section, with a specific focus on arguments that may be 
useful for a better understanding of the French situation. A general empirical overview is then 
given that refers to the French regional banking density and activity. The third paragraph 
introduces the data and the method of analysis. Results are given in the fourth one. 
                                                 
1 On the one hand, Mayer (1988) and Corbett and Jenkinson (1996), using flows of gross data, do not find any 
difference in the way firms are financed. On the other hand, Hackethall and Schmidt (2003) using net data show 
that differences in the financing patterns of firms still remain at least for Germany, Japan, France and the United-
Kingdom.  
2 For instance, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) for the USA and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) for Italy. 
 2. Should local patterns of the French financing system matter in 
the financing of new small firms? 
In this section, we consider the arguments for and against the potential influence of 
local financing patterns on the financing of small firms and more specifically of new firms 
(2.1.). We then give an overview of the situation of the French regional financial system 
(2.2.). 
 
2.1. Why would local patterns of the financing system matter? The 
theoretical background 
 
2.1.1. The importance of local patterns: the “ pro” arguments 
Bank lending to small firms is closely linked to banks’ ability to gather information on 
these firms. When bankers cannot collect enough information about small firms, they prefer 
limiting their supply of credit to using other devices such as increasing interest rates or asking 
for new warranties3. The solution to avoid credit rationing is thus to increase the flow of 
information from firms to bankers.  
As bankers are outsiders, their access to the financial information of the firm is not 
statutory favoured. Two situations may be described: either the information is given by firms 
to banks or this information is “in the air” and can be integrated in a diffuse way by bankers. 
The former is the “hard” information and the latter the “soft” one (Stein, 2002). The “hard” 
information concerns all financial accounts and formalised information such as legal status, 
formal agreements and all other reporting devices. The “soft” information is not formalized at 
all and is based on the reputation of firms and owners–managers themselves. 
According to Hauswald and Marquez (2003), the quality of information is decreasing 
with distance as soft information is supposed to vanish. Thus, informational asymmetries can 
be assumed to be more important when the distance between lenders and firms is greater. As a 
consequence, credit rationing should be higher for firms the informational system of which is 
more opaque and less rich in “hard” information (Stein, 2002), as is the case with new firms 
and, specifically, new innovative ones. 
As a result, when the financing of new firms is concerned, the relevance of 
geographical distance in the management of credit should be emphasized. By improving the 
transfer of “soft” information between lenders and borrowers, proximity should allow the 
decrease in informational asymmetries, which are responsible for the collapse of the credit 
market for new firms. According to this argument, the rationing of new firms should increase 
with the level of centralisation in the banking sector. A high level of centralisation indeed 
corresponds to a low level of delegation; in this system, only hard information can be 
transferred from local desks to decision centres (Liberti, 2003).  
To sum up, proximity should improve the financing patterns of small firms as they can 
be assumed to suffer from informational asymmetries: this is the “Church Tower Principle” 
(Carling and Lundberg, 2002). According to this principle, geographical proximity between 
borrowers and lenders matters in the management of credit risk. However, we must keep in 
mind that proximity is not always perceived as improving the financial situation of firms. 
Proximity can indeed build barriers to entry in the credit market so that the price of credit can 
be higher because of the pre-existing relationships (Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992). Information 
                                                 
3 However, when bankers observe an increase of the risk represented by small firms, then they ask for new 
warranties or/and they charge a higher interest rate on credit (Cieply, Grondin, 1999). 
 sharing may indeed serve as a collusive device which can soften competition (Bouckaert, 
Degryse, 2004). As the problem of new firms is more the access to the credit market than the 
cost of loan, we only consider in this article the favourable effect of close relationships 
between banks and firms. For the moment, in our demonstration, close relationships are 
strictly associated with proximity. However, the revolution in information technologies which 
has taken place for over ten years could have softened this link. 
2.1.2. The irrelevance of local patterns: the “contra” arguments  
With the pervasive use of new information technologies, the cost for transferring 
information has decreased so that “information is available at substantially lower costs now 
than it used to be” (Buch, 2002, p.2). The result might be an increase in the distance between 
bankers and their customers. 
In the international banking lending area, Buch (2002) demonstrates the declining 
importance of distance in the United-States. Petersen and Rajan (2002) find quite the same 
result when the domestic banking lending is analysed: the geographical distance between 
banks and their borrowers has indeed been increasing over time in the U.S.A. The case of the 
United-States is specific insofar as the “Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act” of 1994 has allowed full nation-wide banking across the country, regardless 
of state law4. Yet Carling and Lundberg (2002) bring into light quite the same result for 
Sweden. At a sensibly different geographical scale, Degryse and Ongena (2005) underline this 
trend result for Belgium as well. To sum up, banks in these countries have recently tended to 
lend across larger distances.  
Moreover, Petersen and Rajan (2002) underline the fact that small firms use new tools 
to communicate and transfer messages in a more impersonal way. According to these results, 
small firms cannot be too closely associated with soft information as they have started using 
the same impersonal information as large firms do. These authors demonstrate that this 
increase in distance in banking relationships cannot be associated with a fall in credit to small 
firms. On the contrary, they appear to favour a better access to credit for small firms: “Our 
findings also suggest that the natural credit market faced by small firms may be growing 
steadily in size” (Petersen, Rajan 2002, p. 2535). With the development of new cheaper ways 
of communication, the American banking system has seen its productivity increased and the 
ability of employees to treat information increased as well. Quite the same result is obtained 
by Carling and Lundberg (2002). These authors find no support for the existence of the 
“Church Tower Principle” in the Swedish corporate banking system between 1994 and 2000; 
they could not find “any evidence that the information asymmetry increased with distance” 
nor did they find “any evidence that the bank acted as if it was the case”, that is to say decided 
to reduce its supply of credit to small firms. What was the situation in France in the middle of 
the nineties?  
 
                                                 
4 This Act has radically modified the legal environment of the American banking sector. Before it was passed, 
the McFadden Act, signed in 1927, specifically prohibited intrastate branching by allowing a national bank to 
branch only within the city in which it is located. Prior to 1994, the banking legislation had limited the ability of 
a holding company bank to own and operate banks in more than one state. The “Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act” has resulted in increased consolidation and concentration in the banking industry. 
While the United States had 14,399 banks in 1940, the country has fewer than 9,000 banks today. However, 
while consolidation among banks has certainly been the trend, the number of branches in the U.S. has steadily 
increased. 
 2.2. The French banking system under review 
The question of the influence of proximity (or distance) on the access of small firms to 
credit has not yet been studied in the French context. This question could even been 
considered devoid of any interest as the French banking system appears to have been built 
under the principle of an equal access of French citizens to banking services, in particular 
after the 1945 banking law which enforced the nationalisation of a significant part of the 
French banking sector.  
However, the French financial system has radically changed over the last twenty years. 
On the one hand, French banks have largely become private since 1986. On the other hand, 
mergers and some other restructuring measures have the local banking sector disappearing. 
Almost all banks are now integrated into networks of large banks. In this context, some keep a 
regional approach for their activities; this is mainly the case of the mutual banks and of some 
commercial banks as for example the Credit Industriel et Commercial (CIC) which bought 
lots of local or regional banks. Some others, in particular the “three old ones” (BNP, Société 
Générale and Crédit Lyonnais) have developed a more centralized approach; for example they 
organise the turnover of bankers within a national program (Quack, Hildebrandt, 1996) and 
they use rating tools more and more to decide to distribute credit or not. Thus, the 
concentration of the French banking system has significantly increased. How could this 
evolution influence the nature of relationships between banks and borrowers? Has the 
distance between them rather increased or decreased? 
To answer this question, three points at least may be considered: 
1. The use by bankers and firms of electronic tools to communicate with each other. 
2. The importance of proximity for banks when the decision to lend (or not to) is at stake. 
3. The analysis of statistics available on the density of banking activity in France. 
 
2.2.1. The use of electronic tools by bankers and small firms 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) bring into light, for the nineties in the United-States, the 
fact that bankers and customers were using electronic tools to communicate with each other 
more and more and that there was an increase in distance. In France, customers have been 
using these tools since the beginning of the new century. Nowadays in banking groups, selling 
these new tools has indeed become a new source of profit. However this trend and its impact 
on banking relationships, if it exists in France, is relatively new. In a survey carried out in 
1998 on a sample of French bankers, new electronic tools were not mentioned as being 
intensively used (Carluer, Cieply, Grondin, 2000). The way to communicate was rather 
traditional and was essentially based on the phone, except at the beginning of relationships or 
when difficulties arose. In these two cases, appointments in firms and in banks are common. 
So, as we study the situation of French new firms between 1994 and 1999, we cannot retain 
the hypothesis of an increasing use of electronic tools entailing a decrease in the importance 
of proximity when the financing of small firms is concerned.  
2.2.2. The importance of proximity for the French banking system 
Although mergers increase the concentration in the French banking sector, banks still 
appear to be looking for proximity. Mutual banks, which represent a highly significant part of 
the market of credit to small firms, are organised with few hierarchical levels thus ensuring 
 that the decisions concerning credit are taken locally5. Moreover, the decision-making system 
in mutual banks associates customers, who are members of the credit committee; this situation 
can create an intellectual proximity between banks and firms. Finally, mutual banks organise 
the turnover of employees at a regional level so that soft information can always be kept in 
mind. Admittedly commercial banks tend to be more centralised than mutual banks, with a 
national organisation of labour and a hierarchical organisation, but they are trying to 
decentralise themselves. They are creating new tools to manage risk credit at a decentralised 
level and, like mutual banks, they tend to delegate power more. Carluer, Cieply and Grondin 
(2001) underline the existence of 2 to 6 levels of delegation in French banks and the fact that , 
for each level, the range of power may be very different. However the survey shows that 
delegation of power has significantly increased over the last ten years.  
Thus, except for new firms which need a large amount of funds, like, for example, 
buyouts or new technological firms, the decision to lend to small firms remains a local 
decision. However are French firms located in different regions equals when they need loans? 
2.2.3. Regional banking: an appraisal of density and activity 
This section presents an appraisal of the French regional banking intensity and activity 
through the examination and discussion of a brief selection of statistical indicators. The 
French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies6 and the French Central Bank 
(Banque de France) were the providers of the data. All refer to the year 1994. The first 
semester of this year also corresponds with the period during which information about new 
firms has been collected for the SINE database that is exploited in sections 3 and 4. 
The density of the regional banking supply is assessed through the number of counters 
(“guichets bancaires de plein exercice” – “fully operating bank counters”) referred to five 
regional variables: the regional surface (in square kilometres), the number of inhabitants, the 
number of inhabitants in urban municipalities7, the number of urban municipalities and the 
regional domestic product (in value, base: 1995). 
 
                                                 
5 To sum up, we can in general distinguish between three hierarchical levels: the local one for most decisions 
concerning customers, whatever their nature (firms or consumers), the regional one for the riskiest decisions and 
the national level which is a political representation level and a refinancing structure for the banks. 
6 Insee (Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques). 
7 As estimated by the proportion of inhabitants living in urban municipalities in 1990 times the population in 
1994. Urban municipalities are regularly listed by INSEE according to criteria relating to the agglomeration of 
the local population. The data are collected through the Census. 
 Table 1: Regional banking density in France, 1994 
Region 
 
 
Counters 
/sqkm 
(*100) 
 
 
Counters/inhab.
(*100) 
 
 
Counters/inhab 
in urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
 
Counters/urban 
municipalities 
 
 
Counters/RDP 
in hundred 
millions € 
 
ALSACE 16.75 0.08 0.11 6.22 4.11
AQUITAINE 2.84 0.04 0.06 3.81 2.41
AUVERGNE 2.09 0.04 0.07 4.24 2.61
BOURGOGNE 2.26 0.04 0.08 4.93 2.56
BRETAGNE 5.36 0.05 0.09 7.76 3.18
CENTRE 2.59 0.04 0.06 4.02 2.36
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 1.92 0.04 0.06 3.84 2.10
CORSE 0.90 0.03 0.05 5.20 2.11
FRANCHE-COMTE 2.94 0.04 0.07 3.31 2.55
ILE-DE-FRANCE 37.19 0.04 0.04 7.57 1.36
LANGUEDOC 3.28 0.04 0.06 4.10 2.74
LIMOUSIN 1.94 0.05 0.09 8.00 2.90
LORRAINE 4.73 0.05 0.07 3.29 2.92
MIDI-PYRENEES 2.28 0.04 0.07 4.47 2.48
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 10.84 0.03 0.04 2.56 2.22
BASSE-NORMANDIE 3.39 0.04 0.08 4.03 2.57
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 4.88 0.03 0.05 3.18 1.89
PAYS DE LOIRE 4.80 0.05 0.08 6.64 2.93
PICARDIE 3.14 0.03 0.05 2.34 2.05
POITOU-CHARENTES 2.68 0.04 0.08 5.41 2.71
P.A.C.A. 6.06 0.04 0.05 7.64 2.43
RHONE-ALPES 5.63 0.04 0.06 3.98 2.33
Mean 5.84 0.04 0.07 4.84 2.52
Standard deviation 7.47 0.01 0.02 1.66 0.51
Sources: Banque de France and INSEE; authors’ computations. P.A.C.A., PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D’AZUR. 
 
The examination of the first indicator in Table 1, relating counters to the regional 
surface, might lead to the conclusion that there are huge regional differences in terms of 
banking density. The number of counters by square kilometre reaches a maximum of 0.372 
(the Ile-de-France core region, incl. the city of Paris) and a minimum of 0.009 (the Corsican 
island; see also the high value of the standard deviation compared to the mean). This is a very 
rough and most likely misleading outcome as population and economic activities are hardly 
ever dispersed on the whole regional district, including large portions of forests and fields, but 
are more often organized in agglomeration of different sizes (from small villages to major 
cities and megalopolis areas) and we may expect that counters locate where the market 
demand actually is.  
The next four indicators give the number of counters in relation with proxies for 
potential market demand. Two indicators, out of these four ones, are corrected to take into 
account the more or less urbanized dimension of the region. A completely different picture 
emerges now as it may be observed that the French banking system is quite homogeneous. 
Statistics thus suggest that the banking supply is rather well consistently developed according 
to regional potential demand and economic activity.  
Tables 2 and 3 present indicators of the regional banking activity. The numbers of 
credits granted by the banking system to self-employed people as well as to partnerships and 
corporations are referred to the same regional variables as counters in Table 1.  
 
 Table 2: Regional banking activity in France: number of credits to self-employed people, 1994 
Region 
 
 
 
 
# Credits to 
Self-employed 
people /sqkm 
(*100) 
 
 
# Credits to 
Self-employed 
people /inhab. 
(*100) 
 
 
# Credits to 
Self-employed 
people /inhab 
in urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
 
# Credits to 
Self-employed 
people /urban 
municipalities 
 
 
# Credits to 
Self-
employed 
people /RDP 
in hundred 
millions € 
ALSACE 135.80 0.67 0.90 50.42 33.32
AQUITAINE 56.34 0.81 1.24 75.57 47.84
AUVERGNE 44.70 0.88 1.51 90.84 55.95
BOURGOGNE 47.41 0.92 1.61 103.26 53.59
BRETAGNE 138.16 1.32 2.31 199.96 81.95
CENTRE 53.67 0.87 1.34 83.38 49.05
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 59.05 1.12 1.80 118.13 64.41
CORSE 31.15 1.04 1.78 180.27 73.30
FRANCHE-COMTE 51.44 0.75 1.29 57.88 44.47
ILE-DE-FRANCE 498.31 0.55 0.57 101.44 18.16
LANGUEDOC 59.97 0.74 1.02 74.96 50.16
LIMOUSIN 35.90 0.85 1.65 148.37 53.83
LORRAINE 57.81 0.59 0.82 40.15 35.66
MIDI-PYRENEES 53.49 0.97 1.60 105.00 58.33
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 171.48 0.53 0.62 40.55 35.08
BASSE-NORMANDIE 84.51 1.05 1.98 100.43 63.94
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 99.79 0.69 1.01 65.04 38.68
PAYS DE LOIRE 92.11 0.94 1.51 127.37 56.28
PICARDIE 73.76 0.77 1.27 55.03 48.06
POITOU-CHARENTES 64.30 1.03 2.02 129.66 65.04
P.A.C.A. 80.39 0.57 0.64 101.37 32.23
RHONE-ALPES 82.44 0.65 0.85 58.29 34.11
Mean 94.18 0.83 1.33 95.79 49.70
Standard deviation 92.55 0.20 0.47 40.81 14.47
Sources: Banque de France and INSEE; authors’ computations. P.A.C.A., PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D’AZUR. 
 
Once again, a very contrasted France comes into view when the number of credits is 
considered in relation to the geographical size of the region; Ile-de-France, Alsace, Nord-Pas-
de-Calais and Rhône-Alpes appear as the top four regions and Corse, Auvergne and Limousin 
are at the bottom. This contrasted image almost disappears as soon as the observed banking 
activity is put into relation with the regional population or the regional domestic product.  
The Île-de-France region deserves a specific comment having the three lowest relative 
values (out of four indicators) as regard the number of credits to self-employed people and the 
highest ones for credits to partnerships and corporations.  
 
 Table 3: Regional banking activity in France: number of credits to partnerships and corporations, 1994 
Region 
 
 
 
# Credits to 
Corporation/ 
sqkm (*100) 
 
 
# Credits to 
Corporation/ 
inhab. (*100) 
 
 
# Credits to 
Corporation/in
hab in urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
# Credits to 
Corporation/ 
urban 
municipalities 
 
# Credits to 
Corporation/
RDP in 
hundred 
millions € 
ALSACE 447.66 2.20 2.97 166.22 109.85
AQUITAINE 96.72 1.40 2.13 129.72 82.13
AUVERGNE 53.88 1.07 1.82 109.51 67.44
BOURGOGNE 69.68 1.36 2.36 151.77 78.76
BRETAGNE 168.83 1.62 2.82 244.35 100.14
CENTRE 84.84 1.37 2.11 131.81 77.53
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 127.71 2.42 3.89 255.48 139.32
CORSE 38.16 1.28 2.18 220.80 89.78
FRANCHE-COMTE 89.71 1.31 2.25 100.94 77.56
ILE-DE-FRANCE 6236.11 6.84 7.10 1269.52 227.21
LANGUEDOC 88.98 1.10 1.51 111.22 74.42
LIMOUSIN 41.01 0.97 1.88 169.46 61.49
LORRAINE 118.26 1.20 1.67 82.14 72.95
MIDI-PYRENEES 75.96 1.38 2.27 149.13 82.84
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 376.06 1.17 1.36 88.92 76.93
BASSE-NORMANDIE 98.74 1.23 2.32 117.34 74.70
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 168.87 1.17 1.70 110.06 65.46
PAYS DE LOIRE 160.71 1.65 2.63 222.24 98.19
PICARDIE 108.43 1.14 1.86 80.90 70.65
POITOU-CHARENTES 106.67 1.70 3.35 215.08 107.89
P.A.C.A. 186.37 1.33 1.48 235.02 74.72
RHONE-ALPES 240.59 1.89 2.48 170.12 99.56
Mean 417.45 1.67 2.46 205.99 91.34
Standard deviation 1245.60 1.16 1.15 233.05 33.76
Sources: Banque de France and INSEE; authors’ computations. P.A.C.A., PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D’AZUR. 
 
Tests on Pearson’s pairwise and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between 
indicators have been performed. They globally show significant and positive 
interrelationships inside each of the three blocks of indicators (counters, credit to self-
employed people and corporate credit indicators)8. That means, for example, that the number 
of counters (credits) per capita is positively correlated with the number of counters (credits) 
referred to the Regional Domestic Product. 
The results as we cross indicators from different blocks reveal no significant 
interrelationships that might be convincingly and univocally interpreted (Table 4). In some 
cases, the Spearman rank test allows to correct some spurious Pearson outcomes9. The 
adequate comment, expressed in general terms, would be that regional banking with regard to 
its density and activity appears almost homogeneous, after some standardization of the data 
has been completed. 
 
                                                 
8 Indicators associating counters and credits with the regional surface being taken out of the database. 
Significance is at the 10% level at least, with only one exception. The detailed results are available on request to 
the authors. 
9 Pearson being sensitive to extreme values, in contrast with the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
 Table 4: Regional banking density and activity: tests on Pearson and Spearman coefficients 
PEARSON 
 Counters/inhab. 
(*100) 
Counters/inhab in 
urban municipalities 
(*100) 
Counters/urban 
municipalities 
 
Counters/RDP in 
hundred millions € 
 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/inhab. 
(*100) 
-0.0602 
(0.7902) 
0.4302 
(0.0457) 
0.1814 
(0.4191) 
0.1864 
(0.4063) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/inhab in urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
-0.0680 
(0.7636) 
0.5047 
(0.0166) 
0.1588 
(0.4804) 
0.2142 
(0.3384) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/urban 
municipalities 
-0.0933 
(0.6795) 
0.2465 
(0.2688) 
0.6548 
(0.0009) 
0.0503 
(0.8242) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/RDP in hundred 
millions € 
-0.1610 
(0.4741) 
0.3646 
(0.0953) 
0.0847 
(0.7079) 
0.2105 
(0.3471) 
SPEARMAN 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/inhab. 
(*100) 
0.0344 
(0.8791) 
0.5347 
(0.0103) 
0.2580 
(0.2463) 
0.2253 
(0.3134) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/inhab in urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
0.1045 
(0.6436) 
0.6183 
(0.0022) 
0.3043 
(0.1685) 
0.2976 
(0.1786) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/urban 
municipalities 
0.1022 
(0.6509) 
0.3089 
(0.1619) 
0.7222 
(0.0001) 
0.1350 
(0.5493) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/RDP in hundred 
millions € 
-0.0514 
(0.8204) 
0.4625 
(0.0302) 
0.2388 
(0.2844) 
0.2603 
(0.2420) 
Prob-value in parentheses. 
 Table 4: Regional banking density and activity: tests on Pearson and Spearman coefficients (cont.) 
PEARSON 
 Counters/inhab. 
(*100) 
Counters/inhab in 
urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
Counters/urban 
municipalities 
 
Counters/RDP in 
hundred millions € 
 
# Credits to 
Corporation /inhab. 
(*100) 
0.0895 
(0.6922) 
-0.2038 
(0.3631) 
0.3786 
(0.0823) 
-0.3860 
(0.0760) 
# Credits to 
Corporation /inhab in 
urban municipalities 
(*100) 
0.1164 
(0.6059) 
-0.0209 
(0.9264) 
0.4043 
(0.0620) 
-0.3055 
(0.1668) 
# Credits to 
Corporation /urban 
municipalities 
-0.0162 
(0.9428) 
-0.2552 
(0.2517) 
0.4934 
(0.0196) 
-0.4430 
(0.0390) 
# Credits to 
Corporation /RDP in 
hundred millions € 
0.1037 
(0.6461) 
-0.1435 
(0.5240) 
0.3781 
(0.0827) 
-0.3248 
(0.1402) 
SPEARMAN 
# Credits to 
Corporation /inhab. 
(*100) 
0.2953 
(0.1821) 
0.1440 
(0.5226) 
0.2919 
(0.1874) 
-0.0503 
(0.8242) 
# Credits to 
Corporation /inhab in 
urban municipalities 
(*100) 
0.3077 
(0.1635) 
0.4444 
(0.0383) 
0.4026 
(0.0632) 
0.0875 
(0.6985) 
# Credits to 
Corporation /urban 
municipalities 
0.2580 
(0.2463) 
0.1090 
(0.6293) 
0.7504 
(0.0001) 
0.0152 
(0.9463) 
# Credits to 
Corporation /RDP in 
hundred millions € 
0.1824 
(0.4166) 
0.1350 
(0.5493) 
0.3405 
(0.1210) 
-0.0232 
(0.9185) 
Prob-value in parentheses. 
 
 Table 4: Regional banking density and activity: tests on Pearson and Spearman coefficients (cont.) 
PEARSON 
 # Credits to Self-
employed people 
/inhab. 
(*100) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/inhab in urban 
municipalities 
(*100) 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/urban municipalities 
# Credits to Self-
employed people 
/RDP in hundred 
millions € 
# Credits to 
Corporations /inhab. 
(*100) 
-0.2235 
(0.3173) 
-0.2945 
(0.1834) 
0.0534 
(0.8134) 
-0.4230 
(0.0498) 
# Credits to 
Corporations /inhab 
in urban 
municipalities (*100) 
0.0406 
(0.8577) 
-0.0167 
(0.9412) 
0.2210 
(0.3230) 
-0.1808 
(0.4206) 
# Credits to 
Corporations /urban 
municipalities 
-0.1841 
(0.4122) 
-0.2432 
(0.2755) 
0.1991 
(0.3745) 
-0.3556 
(0.1043) 
# Credits to 
Corporations /RDP in 
hundred millions € 
-0.0590 
(0.7943) 
-0.1520 
(0.4995) 
0.1626 
(0.4697) 
-0.2605 
(0.2416) 
SPEARMAN 
# Credits to 
Corporations /inhab. 
(*100) 
0.1395 
(0.5359) 
0.0446 
(0.8437) 
0.2456 
(0.2705) 
-0.0367 
(0.8712) 
# Credits to 
Corporations /inhab 
in urban 
municipalities (*100) 
0.4512 
(0.0351) 
0.4173 
(0.0533) 
0.4602 
(0.0312) 
0.2942 
(0.1839) 
# Credits to 
Corporations /urban 
municipalities 
0.3089 
(0.1619) 
0.2739 
(0.2175) 
0.7391 
(0.0001) 
0.2230 
(0.3184) 
# Credits to 
Corporations /RDP in 
hundred millions € 
0.2242 
(0.3159) 
0.1417 
(0.5293) 
0.3337 
(0.1291) 
0.1101 
(0.6257) 
Prob-value in parentheses. 
 
 
3. Setting up the empirics at the individual level of the firm  
We rely on the SINE data to try to ascertain and empirically test the influence of local 
financing patterns on the probability to be more or less financially constrained. These data 
give us information on the financing policy of young firms when they are created and 
possibly when they face financial problems in the following two years. The SINE dataset does 
not refer to the general entrepreneurial intention in the French population but to 
entrepreneurial projects that are concretized in new firms. As a consequence, entrepreneurial 
intentions that are aborted due to financial constraints are not reported. The point is of 
importance as the firm financing conditions are considered. For the purpose of the research 
we construct classes that are representative of credit rationing. 
3.1. Data 
The survey (Sine 94-1) was conducted by the French National Institute of Statistical 
and Economic Studies in 1994 and takes into account 30 778 firms which had been set up or 
taken over during the first half of 1994 and which had survived at least for one month. The 
sample10 is originally representative of the total population of entrepreneurs which was of 
                                                 
10 The sample was built by randomly drawing out samples from the 416 (2x8x26) elementary strata. These strata 
are classified according to the origin (start-up or takeover: 2 modalities), the branch (8 modalities) and the 
 96 407 new firms (it is a compulsory survey which obtained a 98,8 % rate of reply). In this 
survey, new firms are identified on the basis of their registration in the “Système 
d'Informations et de Répertoire des Entreprises et des Etablissements" (SIRENE repertory11). 
The units belong to the private productive sector in the fields of industry, building, trade and 
services. This survey identifies qualitative data surrounding entrepreneurship and, more 
precisely, it contains variables related to the entrepreneur, to the context and to the 
environment of entrepreneurship. 
A second survey carried out in 1997 (Sine 94-2) gives us information about the status 
of the same firms (closed down or still running). In 1997, 16 039 firms were still running and 
replied to the second survey. They represent, after correction12, 44 962 firms. For the firms 
that are still running, this survey also explores the financial behaviour of the firm during the 
last two years and the financial problems they faced. On the basis of this second survey, we 
construct classes of credit rationing. For a more appropriate homogeneity of our data basis we 
consider only new firms without legal change (firms which are transformed from sole 
proprietorship into limited partnership), set up by a man or a woman (without subsidiaries) in 
the metropole area (overseas department excluded). At this stage we obtain 12681 units which 
represent 36509 firms. 
Classes that are representative of credit rationing are constructed combining questions 
extracted from both the first survey of 1994 and the additional survey of 1997. The first 
questions, extracted from Sine 94-1, give us information about requests for bank loans by 
firms prior to the setting-up and the decision of banks (either to lend or not to lend). The other 
questions are extracted from the second 1997 survey and take into account the financial 
problems the firm faced over the last two years.  
By considering the survey of 1997, we only consider the situation of firms which were 
established in 1994 and which were still alive in 1997. What appears as problematic from a 
methodological viewpoint leads us however not to consider as rationed firms that were “lame 
ducks” and that were identified as bad firms by bankers. A good discrimination process which 
consists in not lending to bad firms (firms that will quickly die) should not be considered as a 
rationing process13.  
 
Four modalities of the “financial constraint” variable can be distinguished: 
1. The “No rationing” modality is made up of two kinds of firms. The first ones 
asked for bank loans and were granted them. The second ones did not ask for bank 
loans and did not face any financial problems during 1996-1997. 
2. The “Self constraint” modality concerns firms that did not ask for bank loans but 
should have asked for some as they faced financial constraints during 1996-1997. 
3. The “Weak constraint” modality groups together firms that did ask for bank loans 
and were granted them but they faced financial problems during 1996-1997. 
4. The “Strong rationing” modality gathers firms that did ask for bank loans and were 
refused them in 1994. 
                                                                                                                                                        
localization (22 French regions plus 4 overseas départements). The data basis must be used with the correction 
of a weight variable (the reverse of the draw rate per branch, per region and per origin). 
11 Yet economic “activations” and “reactivations” are excluded from the surveyed sample. Economic 
“activations” correspond to units which do not have any activity and which decide to exercise one. Economic 
“reactivations” correspond to units which have stopped their activity and which start up again. They only deal 
with individual entrepreneurs -craftsmen or shopkeepers-. Financial and agricultural activities and the French 
units established abroad are set aside, as well. 
12 From now on, we shall only reason about corrected firms. 
13 Note that rationed firms represent only 5.20% of the firms that ceased their activities before 1997. They 
represent 3.26% of the firms that are still alive in 1997. 
 Because of the lack of information about the building of the credit rationing variable, 
the data basis is now restrained to 12231 units which represent 35115 firms. 
3.2. Methodology 
 To study the importance of financial constraints, we refer to the descriptive analysis of 
the results we obtain for the modalities of the “financial constraint” variable. The difference in 
financial constraints between French regions is analysed with logit models. These models 
estimate the probability to be financially constrained. Endogenous variables are each modality 
of the "financial constraint” variable. The exogenous variables are dummy variables 
representative of the French regions. Considering the heterogeneity of our population, we take 
into account control variables that are representative of the new firm and of the profile of the 
entrepreneur (Annex 1).  
 Several sub-samples of firms are moreover distinguished. First, there is the sub-sample 
of innovative firms which belong to the classification of innovative branches given by the 
OECD and used in the French system of statistics (Annex 2). The situation of innovative 
firms is specifically analysed as informational problems and risk exposure for lenders are 
more acute when borrowers are innovative. Second, the origin of the firm (start-up or 
takeover) is also to be taken into account because the renewal of the productive system may 
be different at the local level in France. Moreover the informational gap is important between 
these two types of firms as new firms, in the contrary of buyouts, cannot produce any track 
record. Third, we consider two branches of activity, the residential branch which gathers 
catering, services for households and trade and the professional branch which gathers 
industry, food industry, transports, construction and services for enterprises. The two branches 
of activity refer, for the first one, to activities mainly driven by the demand of households 
(residential activity) and, for the second one, to activities mainly driven by the demand of 
enterprises (professional activity). This split is justified by the development of the tertiary branch 
and by the important migratory flows that affect some French regions. Regional development is 
thus partly linked to the expenses of households and, to some extent, to the attractiveness of 
locales and the mobility of the population, which are not only linked to jobs (tourism, retired 
people)14. Moreover, at the financial level the professional sector is used to benefit from a 
wider financial supply thanks to private equity and for the residential sector thanks to 
favourable terms of trade credit. 
4. Looking for regional disparities in new firms’ financial 
constraints 
 The empirical research leads to two main results. Firstly, financial constraints exist at 
the firm level and are, above all, induced by firms themselves which do not anticipate their 
financial needs or which are afraid of asking banks for credit (4.1.). Secondly, we observe 
average differences concerning the intensity of financial constraints that firms are facing as 
they belong to one French region or another (4.2.).  
                                                 
14 By way of example, for the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region, migratory flows made up of retired people 
are often put forward to account for the setting-up of new firms in the households’ services and trade sectors. 
The migration of working families to Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées regions entailing the loss of a 
job for one member of the family cell and leading in return to the setting-up of new activities may also be 
observed (Thireau, 1993). Ashcroft et alii (1991), Keeble and Walker (1993), Guesnier (1994), among others, 
also point to the fact that the appearance of new firms is facilitated by the concentration of activities, in 
particular with a demand effect arising in large agglomerations. This effect is particularly strong in the 
households’ services, the manufacturing service industry and less importantly in the trade industry and in the 
craft activities.  
 
 4.1. The diversity of financial constraints  
 
 Table 5 highlights the diversity of the financial constraints new firms may suffer 
from. 
 
 
Table 5: Cross table of credit rationing with innovative firms in the population of firms still 
running in 1997 
  Not 
innovative Innovative Total 
Frequency 
Cell Chi-Square 
Percent 
Row percent 
Col percent 
No credit rationing 
20647
0.02
58.79
96.76
60.82
691
0.56
1.97
3.24
59.06
21338 
 
60.77 
 
Self-constraint 
7129
0.75
20.30
95.68
21.00
322
21.90
0.91
4.32
27.52
7451 
 
21.22 
 
Weak constraint 
5088
1.20
14.49
98.17
14.98
95
34.95
0.27
1.83
8.11
5183 
 
14.76 
 
 
 
Strong rationing 
1081
0.52
3.08
94.58
3.18
62
15.02
0.18
5.42
5.29
1143 
 
3.26 
 Total 33945
96.67
1170
3.33
35115 
100.00 
 Three degrees of freedom 
Pb(0,05)(Chi2>74.93=0.00) 
 
 More than 60% of the firms are not constrained15. The rationing hypothesis concerns 
39.24% of the sample. More precisely, only 3.26% suffered from a strong credit rationing; 
only 1143 firms, relative to the global sample of 35115 firms, had been redlined. 14.76% did 
not get all the loans they had asked for; these 5183 new firms suffered from a weak credit 
rationing. Finally, 21.22% did not ever asked for a loan although they needed external 
financing; these firms are supposed to auto constrain themselves.  
 This hierarchy is maintained when innovative sectors only are taken into account, 
represented by 1170 firms in our sample. 40.94% of the sample is concerned with credit 
rationing. At this global level, the situation of innovative firms appears to be very similar to 
the situation of all new firms. When we distinguish among banking constraints, we observe 
                                                 
15 But remember that the SINE dataset refers to entrepreneurial projects that are concretized in new firms and 
not to entrepreneurial intentions among the labor force. As a consequence, entrepreneurial intentions that are 
aborted due to financial constraints are not reported.  
 that strong rationing is significantly higher for innovative firms (5.29%) whereas weak 
rationing is less prevalent (8.11%). Self-constraint is also more important (27.52%).  
 These results, in particular the higher rates of strong credit rationing and self 
constraint, can be explained by the pressure of uncertainty which affects both bankers and 
innovative firms. As soon as innovative firms are financed, their quality, which is linked to 
their innovative behaviour, can explain the lower frequency of weak rationing for these firms.  
 
Table 6: Cross table of credit rationing for start-ups and takeovers in the population of firms still 
running in 1997 
  Start-up Takeover Total 
Frequency 
Cell Chi-Square 
Percent 
Row percent 
Col percent 
No credit rationing 
13962
0.07
39.76
65.43
60.91
7376
0.14
21.01
34.57
60.50
21338 
 
60.77 
 
Self-constraint 
5646
125.65
16.08
75.78
24.63
1805
236.28
5.14
24.22
14.81
7451 
 
21.22 
 
Weak constraint 
2469
247.22
7.03
47.64
10.77
2714
464.87
7.73
52.36
22.26
5183 
 
14.76 
 
 
 
Strong rationing 
847
13.62
2.41
74.10
3.69
296
25.61
0.84
25.90
2.43
1143 
 
3.26 
 Total 22924
65.28
12191
34.72
35115 
100.00 
 Three degrees of freedom 
Pb(0,05)(Chi2>1113,46=0.00) 
 
 The frequency of “no rationing” is quite the same for start-ups and takeovers 
(approximately 60%) (Table 6). The nature of financial constraints is however very different. 
As expected takeover firms are significantly less strongly constrained than starts-up. 
Informational asymmetries which induce credit rationing are less important for takeovers as 
track records exist and can be analysed to study the quality of firms. They display less “self-
constraint”; the existence of a previous activity seems to encourage managers to ask for bank 
loans. They are, however, more frequently weakly constrained, or in other words, according 
to our definition and hypotheses, they did not obtain a sufficient amount of credit. This 
situation can be explained by the banking risk management as financing takeovers still remain 
a risky operation (Abdesselam, Bonnet, Le Pape, 2004, a). 
 
 Table 7: Cross table of credit rationing with branches of activity in the population of firms still running 
in 1997 
  Residential Professional Total 
Frequency 
Cell Chi-Square 
Percent 
Row percent 
Col percent 
No credit rationing 
10793
17.82
30.74
50.58
58.35
10545 
19,88 
30.03 
49.42 
63.46 
21338 
 
60.77 
 
Self-constraint 
3675
15.93
10.47
49.32
19.87
3776 
17.73 
10.75 
50.68 
22.72 
7451 
 
21.22 
 
Weak constraint 
3410
169.20
9.71
65.79
18.43
1773 
188.35 
5.05 
34.21 
10.67 
5183 
 
14.76 
 
 
 
Strong rationing 
620
0.53
1.77
54.24
3.35
523 
0.59 
1.49 
45.76 
3.15 
1143 
 
3.26 
 Total 18498
52.68
16617 
47.32 
35115 
100.00 
 Three degrees of freedom 
Pb(0,05)(Chi2>429.98=0.00) 
 
 The frequency of “no rationing” is superior in the professional branch of activity 
(Table 7) and the residential branch shows a higher level of weakly constrained firms. These 
results may be explained by a higher quality, in particular in terms of the human capital of the 
entrepreneur in the professional sector. We show a lower level of “self-constraint” for the 
residential branch. This result may be explained by the lower financial needs of these firms 
which do not suffer from unfavourable terms of trade credit. Finally, the two branches do not 
differ for the class of strongly rationed firms. 
 
4.2. Regional differences in financial constraints  
 The results of the logit models show that significant differences exist between 
French regions. All the comparisons are made in reference to the situation of the Île-de-France 
region (Paris and its area) and take into account two variables of partition, the origin of the 
firm (start-up versus takeover) and the branch of activity (residential versus professional 
activities, as defined above). 
 
 
 Table 8: Regional differences in financial constraints, Start-ups 
 No rationing Self-constraint Weak rationing Strong rationing 
ALSACE 0.31*** -0.76*** 0.82*** -0.90*** 
AQUITAINE 0.03 -0.20*** 0.45*** -0.14 
AUVERGNE 0.33*** -0.46*** 0.06 0.09 
BOURGOGNE 0.25** -0.46*** 0.26* 0.12 
BRETAGNE 0.45*** -0.84*** 0.30** 0.09 
CENTRE 0.26*** -0.55*** 0.49*** -0.27 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE -0.04 -0.12 0.62*** -0.58 
CORSE -1.01*** 0.48*** 0.99*** 0.59* 
FRANCHE-COMTE 0.22* -0.79*** 0.67*** 0.49* 
LANGUEDOC 0.08 -0.19** 0.35*** -0.22 
LIMOUSIN -0.33** -0.07 0.87*** 0.15 
LORRAINE 0.17* -0.60*** 0.60*** 0.37* 
MIDI-PYRENEES -0.00 -0.20** 0.57*** -0.37* 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 0.46*** -0.65*** 0.23* -0.25 
BASSE-NORMANDIE 0.32*** -0.92*** 0.66*** 0.07 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 0.13 -0.29* 0.49*** -0.32 
PAYS DE LOIRE 0.21*** -0.81*** 0.80*** 0.18 
PICARDIE 0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.24 
P.A.C.A. 0.25*** -0.27*** -0.30*** 0.21 
POITOU-CHARENTES 0.23** -0.64*** 0.63*** 0.08 
RHONE-ALPES 0.21*** -0.23*** -0.00 -0.04 
 
Table 9: Regional differences in financial constraints, Takeovers 
 No rationing Self-constraint Weak rationing Strong rationing 
ALSACE 0.49*** -0.49*** -0.02 -1.68*** 
AQUITAINE 0.11 -0.53*** 0.49*** -1.03*** 
AUVERGNE 1.22*** -1.40*** -0.60*** -1.30*** 
BOURGOGNE 0.36*** -0.64*** 0.18 -0.75* 
BRETAGNE 0.59*** -1.03*** 0.09 -1.02*** 
CENTRE 0.30*** -0.83*** 0.39*** -0.93** 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 0.60***    -0.73*** -0.09  -1.02* 
CORSE 0.08 0.17 -0.75* -0.10 
FRANCHE-COMTE 0.39*** -1.19*** 0.43** -2.36** 
LANGUEDOC 0.07 -0.24* 0.27** -0.71** 
LIMOUSIN -0.11 -0.31 0.68*** -0.77 
LORRAINE 0.25** -0.76*** 0.40*** -0.95** 
MIDI-PYRENEES 0.26*** -0.37*** 0.18 -0.97*** 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 0.13 -0.31** 0.22* -0.45* 
BASSE-NORMANDIE 0.10 -0.70*** 0.54*** -0.42 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 0.94*** -0.86*** -0.35** -14.91 
PAYS DE LOIRE 0.36*** -0.99*** 0.36*** -1.36*** 
PICARDIE 0.28** -0.02 -0.14 -1.71*** 
P.A.C.A. 0.29*** -0.13 -0.08 -0.93*** 
POITOU-CHARENTES 0.20* -0.49*** 0.28* -0.57 
RHONE-ALPES 0.36*** -0.48*** 0.21** -2.04*** 
 
Reading of the Tables 8 & 9: a positive and significant coefficient indicates that the probability not to be 
constrained (first column) for the considered region is more important than for the reference region (Île-de-France). 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P.A.C.A., PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D’AZUR. 
  Considering Tables 8 and 9, the probability to be unconstrained is superior (or equal for a 
few regions) in all the French regions in comparison to the referent region (Île-de-France) for the 
population of start-ups. Limousin and Corse are the sole significant exceptions. The probability to 
be self-constrained is inferior in all regions except in Picardie and Limousin where results are not 
significant in the two sub-populations and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Corse for the 
takeover firms only. We can notice that, for start-ups, Champagne-Ardenne is not more self-
constrained than Île-de-France. The probability to suffer from a weak financial constraint is 
superior in all regions in reference to Île-de-France except in Picardie and Rhône-Alpes and 
Auvergne for the start-ups; and Picardie, Champagne-Ardenne, Bourgogne, Alsace, Bretagne, 
Midi-Pyrénées and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur for the takeover firms.  
 Finally, for the takeover firms, the probability to be rationed (strong financial 
constraint) is inferior in 16 French regions in comparison with Île-de-France but only in two 
regions regarding the population of start-ups.  
 Our interpretation of these results is that financial constraints are differentiated within 
French regions. In the Île-de-France region new firms suffer rather greatly from strong rationing 
and self-constraint except for the population of start-ups where the strong rationing is not so 
discriminating among regions. Despite the relative homogeneous nature of the banking sector that 
has been emphasized in the second section, it appears that some regional differences may still be 
at work. An explanation for this fact could lie in the organization of the sector. The banking 
screening process for takeover firms in the capital region may indeed be more intensive since 
buyouts are less numerous. As competition is high for this kind of customers, which are less risky 
than ex nihilo new firms, banking margins should decrease. As credit management is a portfolio 
management in each banking business center, bankers cannot share risks between takeovers; in 
this case, the solution for bankers is to ration credit to buyouts. For start-up firms, the situation is 
very different as competition is less fierce.  
 It could be noticed here that Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes and the southern regions of 
France (Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées) display 
a strong entrepreneurship propensity among their population. It is globally accounted for by a 
high number of start-ups by inhabitant and by a high weight of start-ups versus takeovers in the 
total population of new firms. This is especially the case of Île-de-France where a very strong 
entrepreneurship intensity with regard to the single population of start-ups may be observed 
(Abdesselam, Bonnet, Le Pape, 2004, b).  
 
 
 Table 10: Regional differences in financial constraints, Professional 
 No rationing Self-constraint Weak rationing Strong rationing 
ALSACE 0.61*** -1.19*** 0.68*** -0.60 
AQUITAINE 0.21*** -0.36*** 0.38*** -0.43* 
AUVERGNE 0.50*** -0.83*** 0.46** -0.59 
BOURGOGNE 0.32*** -0.61*** 0.31* 0.06 
BRETAGNE 0.81*** -1.20*** 0.24* -0.40 
CENTRE 0.19* -0.80*** 0.85*** 0.26 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 0.08 -0.40** 0.83*** -0.80* 
CORSE -1.17*** 0.69*** 0.50 1.20*** 
FRANCHE-COMTE 0.32** -0.84*** 0.68*** -0.03 
LANGUEDOC 0.24*** -0.47*** 0.46*** -0.37 
LIMOUSIN -0.23 -0.48** 1.42*** -0.27 
LORRAINE 0.12 -0.60*** 0.80*** -0.01 
MIDI-PYRENEES 0.02 -0.14 0.38*** -0.03 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 0.49*** -0.93*** 0.46*** 0.30 
BASSE-NORMANDIE 0.38*** -1.25*** 0.86*** 0.23 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 0.27** -0.34** 0.33* -1.11** 
PAYS DE LOIRE 0.32*** -0.94*** 0.70*** 0.35* 
PICARDIE 0.04 -0.07 0.18 -0.02 
P.A.C.A. 0.64*** -0.71*** -0.23* -0.41** 
POITOU-CHARENTES 0.29** -0.69*** 0.73*** -0.68* 
RHONE-ALPES 0.29*** -0.44*** 0.39*** -0.39** 
P.A.C.A., PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D’AZUR. 
 
Table 11: Regional differences in financial constraints, Residential 
 No rationing Self-constraint Weak rationing Strong rationing 
ALSACE 0.17* -0.32*** 0.39*** -1.85*** 
AQUITAINE -0.08 -0.21** 0.58*** -0.59*** 
AUVERGNE 0.84*** -0.63*** -0.71*** -0.53* 
BOURGOGNE 0.25*** -0.48*** 0.20 -0.50* 
BRETAGNE 0.33*** -0.69*** 0.18* -0.30 
CENTRE 0.32*** -0.50*** 0.26** -1.72*** 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 0.26** -0.21 -0.05 -0.68* 
CORSE -0.38** 0.24 0.56** -0.60 
FRANCHE-COMTE 0.21* -0.91*** 0.52*** -0.43 
LANGUEDOC -0.11 0.09 0.28*** -0.88*** 
LIMOUSIN -0.21 -0.01 0.49*** -0.32 
LORRAINE 0.24*** -0.77*** 0.37*** -0.25 
MIDI-PYRENEES 0.05 -0.22** 0.45*** -1.39*** 
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 0.15* -0.18* 0.19* -0.80*** 
BASSE-NORMANDIE 0.10 -0.49*** 0.46*** -0.57* 
HAUTE-NORMANDIE 0.51*** -0.55*** -0.11 -1.13*** 
P.A.C.A. -0.05 0.15** -0.13 -0.14 
POITOU-CHARENTES 0.12 -0.47*** 0.31** 0.02 
PAYS DE LOIRE 0.19** -0.82*** 0.53*** -1.24*** 
PICARDIE 0.34*** -0.07 -0.25 -2.13*** 
RHONE-ALPES 0.20*** -0.14* 0.00 -0.67*** 
P.A.C.A., PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE D’AZUR. 
 
 Regarding the two branches of activity, financial constraints are more heterogeneous 
between regions. However, results globally reflect the same behaviour that is to say that the Île-
de-France region is characterized by strongly rationed and self-constrained firms. For the 
professional branch of activity, regions that are less strongly rationed than Île-de-France are only 
six, Corse and Pays de la Loire showing a greater strong rationing constraint. If we combine the 
 two partitions together, we can only observe results for start-ups because we have an insufficient 
number of observations for takeover firms. The probability to be strongly rationed is less 
important in Champagne-Ardenne but more important in Pays de la Loire and Corse for the 
professional branch of activity. If we consider the residential branch of activity, six regions exhibit 
a less important “strong rationing” constraint than in Île de France : Picardie, Centre, Alsace, Pays 
de la Loire, Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-Roussillon; and two regions are significantly more 
strongly rationed, Bretagne and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 To conclude, the assessment of the global situation of the banking density and 
activity within and between the French regions supports the argument of a relatively 
homogeneous banking supply and banking activity, with the activity of the core-region Île-de-
France appearing however more contrasted. As regard the demand side, it appears that, even if 
a majority of the entrepreneurial projects, concretized in new firms, are not facing credit 
rationing, there are still quite a lot of them that significantly suffer from a lack of access to 
finance. The research has shown that the constraint is above all induced by firms themselves 
which do not anticipate their financial needs or which are afraid of asking banks for credit. In 
contrast, strong rationing, that corresponds to credit refusal by banks, only matters for a very 
small part of financial constraints. Moreover these financial constraints have been 
differentiated according to the regions. The Île-de-France region appears to be specific in 
regard to the renewal of the productive system and the associated financial constraints. In this 
region, the strong financial constraint is superior for buyouts whereas in the other regions the 
weak financial constraint is more frequent. According to us, these results could be at least 
partially explained by the different nature of the competition in the banking sector but maybe 
also by the economic structures and characteristics of the region, in terms of entrepreneurial 
dynamics and creation of value. In further research, we will try to test this hypothesis. The 
theoretical background would stress as well the lack of coordination that is to be found in 
metropolitan areas due to the complex superposition of several different networks, leading to 
institutional inefficiencies and administrative inconsistencies, i.e. extending the classical 
phenomenon of congestion. 
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 ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1: Control Variables 
To take into account the observed heterogeneity of the population of new French firms, we also 
include several variables (control variables) representing the firm and the context of its setting-up: 
origin of the firm, branch of industry, financial public aid, start-up size, initial investment at the 
setting-up of the firm. The other variables which have been retained to characterize the 
entrepreneur are: sex, age, nationality, previous status, previous occupation, level of diploma, 
skills acquired during previous activity, length of the experience in the same branch of activity, 
size of the firm in which it was acquired, the belonging to an entrepreneurial “milieu”, the main 
motive for the creation, the present managing experience and the number of new firms setting up 
before. 
 
Annex 2: Definition of Innovative Sectors 
They gather branches from information and communication technologies, and from the fields of 
pharmaceutical products, biotechnology and new materials. The definition of branches relative to 
the ICT given by the OECD encompasses:  
The branches producing information technologies: computers and other computer equipment 
manufacturing (NAF 300C), equipment receiving, recording or reproducing sound and image 
manufacturing (323Z) and hertz emitting and transmitting equipment and phoning equipment 
manufacturing (322 A and B), navigational equipment manufacturing, apparatuses of scientific and 
technical instrumentation manufacturing (332 A et B and 333Z), connector industry (313Z) and 
passive components and condensators manufacturing, electronic components (321 A, C and D). 
The branches distributing information technologies: wholesale computers and computers’ 
equipment; wholesale office equipment (NAF 518 G and H). 
The services of information technologies: telecommunications services (NAF 642), data 
processing services, consulting in computer systems, software production, computer and office 
equipment hiring, data banks activities, computer and office equipment maintenance and fixing, 
other activities related to computers (NAF 72 and 713 E), 
The audio-visual services: TV films production, institutional and advertising films production, 
movies production, technical services for TV and cinema, movies distribution, videotapes 
production and distribution, movies broadcasting, radio activities, TV programs production, TV 
programs broadcasting (921, 922 A, B, D, E and F).  
The other branches encompass several sub-branches in chemistry (industrial gases production, 
other basic inorganic chemical products, other basic organic chemical products, basic plastic 
materials production and basic pharmaceutical products) (NAF 241 A, E, G, L and 244 A). They 
gather branches with a significant level of innovation technology measured by the number of 
patent registered by technological fields according to the study «Key technologies for the French 
industry at the 2000 horizon». This study published by the DiGITIP -Direction Générale de 
l'Industrie, des Technologies de l'Information et des Postes- has been realized on the basis of 
works of well known experts in their field of competencies and results of several surveys related 
to the innovation theme realized by Insee -Institut national des statistiques et des etudes 
économiques- and the DiGITIP. 
